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Our National Schizophrenia
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For several weeks, the theme of our "Policy" section has been the Bush Administration's reticence to even discuss drug policy; no drug czar has been nominated, a tough on drugs AG has been muzzled, and the new administration has clearly taken pains to say nothing quotable.
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| The reason behind that reticence was revealed today (March 21); the New York Times carried an AP report on a Pew Survey of national attitudes towards the drug war conducted in February. What it reveals is nothing less than national schizophrenia: three quarters of Americans see the drug war as a failure which can never succeed. Nevertheless, most see no alternative to its dominant strategies of "interdiction" of drugs and incarceration of both dealers and users. The AP report also reports that the public is slowly moving toward the idea that drug use is a "disease" and that "treatment" should be emphasized over incarceration.
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| The White House was quoted as looking for the "right blend" (presumably of incarceration and "treatment") in developing its drug strategy. They are clearly using the same tactics they scorned Clinton for: crafting a policy that at least seems to conform to public opinion.
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| As is starkly apparent from the poll, that's an impossible task. Given the mind set of those now in power, their most likely tactic will be to pay lip service to their own definitions of "prevention and treatment" while continuing to arrest an ever increasing number of people for "drug crime." Dispositions may become a bit more lenient; the cosmetic use of drug courts may increase, but the real power of government-- to arrest, and extract a plea-bargained felony conviction-- will remain undiminished.
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| The drug policy reform movement is at a crossroads; should we warmly endorse any softening (real or apparent) of drug enforcement, or should we expose the absurdity of our national schizophrenia? Just as interdiction strategies (source country control, crop substitution, interception, crack downs on money laundering, certification, etc.) received widespread endorsement and funding when first announced, we are likely to hear similar high hopes for new strategies of "prevention and treatment." The principal difficulty is that there are no successful models to suggest either will work; especially within a setting of criminal prohibition.
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| Indeed, we have extensive experience with a failed prevention program: D.A.R.E. was consuming seven hundred fifty million dollars a year and failing. When that failure could no longer be denied, its sponsors agreed to accept a "new script;' yet it's still not acknowledged that no successful "prevention" model- one persuading juveniles to resist the blandishments of either legal or illegal agents- has ever been demonstrated.
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| The same caveat applies to "treatment." Demonstrating that "treatment" is cheaper than a long prison sentence is not the same as showing that "treatment" of users will bring about everyone's new favorite goal of "demand reduction."
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| The erroneous assumptions underpinning present policy, together with the deliberate distortions engaged in by those who defend it are largely responsible for the public's confusion. That an overwhelming majority see the drug war as a failure that can't be fixed represents a major opportunity for reform. It's clear that a continued policy of criminal prohibition reliant on impossible goals of "demand reduction" won't succeed either. The time to say that is now; we shouldn't allow a grossly mistaken policy to adopt a false benign coloration.
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by Tom O'Connell
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About the author
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